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5Price Barriers in the Stock Market and Their Effect on the 
Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
By Nathan Blyler
Abstract:  
The predicted price of an American option by the Black-Scholes (B-S) Option 
Pricing Model is known to differ from the market price of that option systematically 
with respect to time to expiration, distance in- or out-of-the-money, and liquidity 
of the option.  We examine the possibility of price barriers in the stock market 
causing further systemic pricing differences between the market price and B-S 
predicted price.  These differences occur when an option’s strike price is near 
a price barrier and differ in effect and significance depending on the position of 
the barrier relative to the underlying stocks’ price.  We find round number price 
barriers in the stock market are beginning to be internalized into the option market. 
Additionally, Bollinger bands and Gann levels appear to receive special attention 
from investors, but do not act as price barriers.  
Keywords: Black-Scholes, Price Barriers, Systematic Errors, Option Market
I. Introduction
A. Financial Background
 The option market is closely related to the stock market in many ways, 
but differs in trading practices and uses.  Similar to the stock market, the options 
market relies on speculation of stock price movement over time, but unlike a 
stock the derivative is only valuable over a set period of time.  In this paper we 
will focus on call options.  A call is simply the right to buy a security at a specified 
price called a strike price.  The writer of a call is agreeing to sell the security at 
the strike price when the buyer exercises the call before a set date.  The buyer 
can choose to let the call expire without ever exercising it, which would normally 
be done if the price of the security falls below the strike price.  Thus, the buyer 
could simply buy the stock at market price for less than the strike price.  In the 
6case where the strike price is above market price, the call is said to be out-of-
the-money, and when the strike price is below the market price, the call is in-the-
money.  Since an option can move into the money at any time, the price of the 
option must not only be the difference between the strike price and the current 
security price to account for immediate exercising (if the call is in-the-money and 
zero otherwise) but also include a time premium for the chance a call moves to 
being in-the-money.  
 Options are appealing to investors for numerous reasons.  They are 
substantially cheaper than buying a security, and are normally settled in cash 
rather than trading the underlying security at the specified price.  This allows 
investors to speculate on a security’s price movement with less initial capital and 
realize larger percentage returns on their investments.  Furthermore, the options 
market allows for speculation on the volatility of a security’s price rather than the 
direction of its movement.  The final use of the options market is to hedge risky 
positions taken in the stock market.  Consider someone who has sold a stock short 
without owning the stock and has unlimited loss potential. However, if she buys a 
call option giving her the right to buy the stock at a given price, she can only lose 
the premium she paid and the difference between the strike price and the price at 
which she short sold the stock.  The use of call options as in this manner led to the 
most well known option pricing method called the Black-Scholes Model.
 In their ground-breaking paper on corporate liabilities, Black and 
Scholes created a model for pricing call options based on hedging to form a 
riskless portfolio of stocks and options (Black and Scholes 1973).  One of their 
assumptions was no arbitrage in the market, so any risk-free portfolio should 
provide a return at the risk free rate, allowing them to find a price for call options 
given the following inputs: security price, strike price, risk free rate, time to 
expiration, and volatility of the underlying security’s returns.  Their predicted 
7price of a call option is found by the following system of equations, which can be 
thought of as the risk adjusted probability an option finishes in the money:
      
     
  
    
where
C0 = Current call option value
S0 = Current stock price
Φ(d) = The probability a random draw from a standard normal distribution will 
be less than d.
X = Exercise price
r = Annualized risk-free interest rate
T = Time to expiration in years
 = Volatility of the underlying stock 
Part of the reason for the widespread use of this model is the ease with 
which most of these inputs can be found, as all are easily observable except for 
volatility.  Therefore, pricing an option becomes a question of how much the 
underlying stock’s price will change during the life of the option.  The higher the 
volatility, or movement in price, the higher the probability the stock’s price will 
end above the strike price.  
The model is built on other assumptions besides no arbitrage, such as 
stock prices follow a Brownian motion, disallowing jumps and predictability. 
Furthermore, the underlying stock is assumed to pay no dividends and the option 
is assumed to not be exercised until expiration.  Additionally, the model assumes 
there are no transaction costs in the option market. The most important assumption 
is the variance of the rate of return of the security is constant.  While most of these 
assumptions obviously do not hold in any market, it is important to note that these 
assumptions only need to hold over the life of an option, not forever, to make the 
model prediction valid.  
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8One can easily see, based both on the use of options and the derivation 
of call pricing, there is a close tie between stock markets and options market. 
Because of this close relationship, we would expect anomalies in security prices to 
result in option pricing anomalies.  A recent finding in behavioral finance involves 
the existence of price barriers, such as whole number values, in the stock market 
(Sonnemans 2003, Dorfleitner et. al. 2009, etc.).  These price barriers, or levels of 
support and resistance, are not unbreakable, but have an effect on the movement of 
stock prices.  As a rising stock price approaches a barrier from below, making that 
barrier a level of resistance, the volatility of the price usually lessens.  If a barrier is 
approached from above, making it a level of support, the stock price’s rate of change 
is again likely to slow (Donaldson and Kim 1993).  
B. Paper Outline
The stock market is one of the last strong holds for purely rational actors, 
with many believers in the efficient market hypothesis even while game theory 
and psychological microeconomics continue to find flaws in the neoclassical 
assumption of rationality.  The efficient market hypothesis does not allow for price 
barriers to exist in the stock market; therefore, rational investors should not treat 
options with strikes near the barriers any different than other options.  An anomaly 
around the barriers would indicate that investors who stand to lose substantial 
amounts of money do not completely believe the efficient market hypothesis.  
Comparing option prices to each other does not allow for analysis as 
they vary in important ways such as distance from the money, time to expiration, 
and underlying stock.  In order to hold these important factors constant and make 
meaningful comparisons, we use the ‘correct’ B-S predicted price of the option, 
found by regression techniques.  Given the existence of price barriers, the B-S 
model should misprice options that have a barrier between the stock and strike 
9price because it does not account for the presence of these barriers. In this paper 
we will examine errors in the B-S model to detect systematic errors around price 
barriers.  
Our findings show round number price barriers found by other studies 
have begun to be internalized into the options market.  This is strong evidence 
against the efficient market hypothesis from the actors that are said to be completely 
rational.  Our other proposed price barriers, Bollinger bands and Gann levels, do 
not act as we hypothesize, but also show investors pay particular attention to 
specific price levels.  Thus, the assumptions made by the B-S model result in other 
systematic errors not yet discussed in the literature.  By combining the behavioral 
finance literature on price barriers and the literature on errors in the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model, this paper is the first to look at price barriers’ effect on 
the options market.  This paper strengthens the argument against efficient stock 
markets by using an efficient option market.  Moreover, it adds to the sizable 
literature on the accuracy of the B-S and how the market price differs from the 
predicted price in systematic ways.
In the next section, a detailed background of other literature on errors 
in the B-S option pricing model caused by the model assumptions is given.  This 
is followed by a brief introduction to the discovery of price barriers in stock 
markets.  The following section describes our methodology of finding the correct 
B-S price and controlling for known systematic errors.  Section four justifies the 
proposed price barriers and the expected findings.  Section five gives a summary 
of the data used, while section six shows the findings.  Finally, section seven 
makes conclusions given the findings and offers alternative hypotheses to explain 
the unexpected results.  
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II. Literature Review
A.  Black-Scholes Systematic Errors
As with all mathematical models, the assumptions of the B-S model have faced 
scrutiny from academics since its introduction in 1973.  Problems with the 
assumptions have emerged in varying degrees from unimportant to creating 
systematic errors in pricing.  To avoid misspecification, known systematic errors 
must be controlled for when examining the difference between the market and 
B-S price.  Theoretically, an American1 option is always worth more in the 
market than exercised, causing many studies to ignore the possibility of early 
exercising as this violation does not appear to cause systematic errors (Merton 
1973, Macbeth and Merville 1979, ect.).  Additionally, investors commonly 
witness jumps in the price of a security from the revealing of new information, 
violating the assumption of Brownian motion and causing the B-S model to 
predict prices under the market price (Merton 1976).  
 The assumption of constant variance in a security’s return throughout 
the life of an option causes significant disparities between observed prices 
and predicted prices.  A common adaptation has been to model variance as an 
unpredictable stochastic process (Chesney and Scott 1989, Hull and White 1987, 
Scott 1987, ect.).  The results of modeling stock return variance in this way 
are inconclusive and make predicting the price of an option considerably more 
difficult.  Hull and White include a volatility of volatility term in their model and 
find the B-S model to over price at- and in-the-money options; however, they 
note the over pricing is caused by a positive correlation between the price of 
the underlying stock and volatility.  This is a problem, because the correlation 
between the two is not constant and has been positive some years and negative 
others (Rubinstein 1978, Schmalensee and Trippe 1978).  Others have tried to 
1  An American option can be exercised any time between its sale and date of expiration.
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model volatility as a function of asset price and time, but failed to achieve better 
results than attempts to smooth out implied volatility over strike price and time 
(Dumas et. al. 2002).  These failures to create a superior model have allowed the 
flawed B-S model to remain the standard in option pricing, and as such be using 
in our analysis of the option market.  
 Ignoring evidence that stock returns do not have a constant variance 
over time, simply estimating the expected variance still causes problems as it is 
the only input not observable in the B-S model.  Weighted historical volatility, 
the simplest of estimators, with recent volatility given the most weight, does not 
include important factors such as: market volatility, price and volatility correlation, 
mergers or other large events, and the volatility implied by the options market 
(Black 1975).  In an efficient market, the relevant information would be entirely 
included in the current market price.  Along these lines, multiple authors have 
found the options market is better at estimating the future volatility of securities 
returns than historical averages (Black and Scholes 1972, Ncube 1996, Blyler 
2012). These studies support our approach to estimating the correct volatility of a 
stock through the options market.  
 The largest differences in market and predicted prices occur when an 
option is far in- or out-of-the-money; however, the direction of these differences 
is debated.  Black finds that far in-the-money options have a market price below 
the B-S predicted price and far out-of-the-money options have a market price 
above it (Black 1975).  Alternatively, Macbeth and Merville find, on average, 
in-the-money options are overpriced by the market and out-of-the-money 
options are underpriced by the market relative to the B-S model (Macbeth and 
Merville 1979).  In partial agreement with the aforementioned authors, Merton 
finds the market price to exceed the B-S predicted price when the option is both 
far in- or out-of-the-money and when the option is close to expiration (Merton 
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1976).  Additionally an option’s time to expiration has been found to generate 
discrepancies between the B-S and market prices.  Options with a short time to 
expiration, three months or less, tend to have a market price greater than predicted 
by the B-S model (Black 1975).  Nevertheless, the extent for which in-the-money 
and out-of-the-money options are mispriced decreases as time to expiration 
decreases (Macbeth and Merville 1979).  Possible explanations for the systematic 
error accompany each finding; however, no paper we are aware of mentions the 
possibility of price barriers in the stock market as a reason for systematic error in 
the B-S option pricing model.  
B. Price Barriers
 The study of humans’ psychological ties to specific numbers and the 
subsequent relation to the stock market is a somewhat recent development. 
Academic papers focus mostly on the human affinity for round numbers, with 
many finding significant price barriers at round numbers (Donaldson and Harold 
1993, Sonnemans 2003, Koedijk and Stork 1994, ect.).  Price barriers have been 
found by observing the frequency of specific stock prices and the rate of change 
in a stock’s price around those levels (Donaldson and Harold 1993, Sonnemans 
2003).  Humans seeing a change in the largest nonzero place holder (e.g. 19.9 
changing to 20.0) as a larger jump than an equivalent monetary jump that leaves 
that number unchanged could be a psychological cause for price barriers in the 
stock market (Sonnemans 2003).  The resistance of breaking a round number is 
found when a stock closes ending in a 9, as those stocks experience significantly 
higher levels of selling off than other stocks (Bagnoli et. al. 2006).  There is also 
evidence of price barriers becoming levels of support as trading volume increases 
after a significant price level is broken (Donaldson and Harold 1993, Huddart 
2005).  The importance of price barriers in the stock market has been known to 
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traders for much longer than its discovery in academia.  From the early works of 
W.D. Gann, and possibly before, some traders have attributed their profits to the 
knowledge of the proportionality of the stock market (Gann 1935).  
 Not all literature is as supportive of the importance of price barriers in the 
stock market, although most have found evidence of it to some extent.  Emerging 
markets, possibly because of more rapid growth, do not exhibit strong support for 
the hypothesis of price barriers (Bahng 2003).  Recently, even in more developed 
markets, such as some in Europe, price barriers were not found to be constant over 
time.  Once the anomalies were recognized, they tended to disappear in accordance 
with the efficient market hypothesis (Dorfleitner and Klein 2009).  Some find that 
while price barriers exist they are of no use to investors because knowledge of the 
barriers does not allow investors to predict a stock’s return (Koedijk and Stork 
1994).  Furthermore, automated investing could result in the formation of price 
barriers because limit orders are usually placed at round numbers, which would 
account for the clustering of prices and increase in trading volume when a stock 
price reaches a round number (Chiao and Wang 2009).  
 This paper examines the effect of price barriers in the stock market 
on the options market and attempts to identify price barriers in stock prices by 
anomalies in option pricing.  If option prices take all market information into 
account, including price barriers, then the difference between the market price 
and the B-S predicted price would vary more near a barrier price.  Examining 
price barriers’ effect on the B-S model extends beyond current literature on price 
barriers, which focuses mainly on locating barriers within stock markets.  The 
paper combines two strands of literature by using similar methodology seen in 
previous studies on the systematic errors in the B-S model and looking for errors 
predicted by behavioral finance theories.  
14
III. Methodology
This paper focuses on testing the validity of the Black-Scholes model 
when accounting for the presence of price barriers through the exploration of 
systematic errors.  Previous literature has found price barriers at round numbers 
for multiple securities by looking at frequency of a security’s price (Donaldson 
and Harold 1993, Sonnemans 2003, Koedijk and Stork 1994, ect.).  As the price of 
a stock approaches a price barrier the movement of the price slows, allowing for 
frequency analysis to locate the barriers.  This results in the Brownian movement 
assumption of the B-S model being violated.  The violation of this assumption at 
select price levels should create an error at those levels that is not seen otherwise. 
Evaluating the difference between the B-S predicted price and the market price is 
contingent on accurately evaluating the volatility of a security’s return to find the 
correct B-S price.
A. Finding the Correct B-S Price
 To accomplish this initial task, we use the methodology of MacBeth 
and Merville in “An Empirical Examination of the Black-Scholes Call Option 
Pricing Model.”  Their analysis is reliant on the assumption that the B-S model 
accurately predicts an at-the-money call option price.  Black notes errors in his 
model on options far in- or out-of-the-money, and in options with less than 90 
days to expiration (Black 1975).  To account for this, the model used to estimate 
implied volatility of a security’s return controls for distance from the money using 
only options with greater than 90 days to expiration.  
Taking the B-S implied volatility of an at-the-money option as the true 
volatility for the underlying security’s returns, we run a regression to estimate this 
volatility.  The regression is run on all options traded on that day for a particular 
security.  In total, 252 trading days per security, less the days the particular security 
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had fewer than 5 different options traded were used.  The estimated regression, 
taken from MacBeth and Merville, is the observed implied volatility of an option’s 
market price regressed on its distance from the money.  The model is given by
where i ranges from 1 to I representative of the I companies, t ranges from January 
3, 2011 to December 30, 2011 for each trading day, and j ranges from 1 to J, 
with J≥5, for all different options of company i on day t.  Here, the only control 
variable m is the distance the option is from the money as a percentage of the 
security’s price.  More formally,
    
 
where S is the stock price of company i on day t, X is the strike price of option j of 
company i discounted by the risk free rate back to its present value.  This measure 
is a slight variation on MacBeth and Merville’s work, where the difference is 
taken as a percentage of strike price.  The use of call options to hedge positions 
caused their measure of distance from the money to be severely skewed, but this 
small variation decreases the skew substantially without drastically changing the 
results (Blyler 2012).
 In the above regression, the intercept  is the estimated implied volatility 
of an at-the-money option.  Our assumption states that this estimate is the correct 
volatility of the underlying security’s return and should be used to find the B-S 
prediction of that security’s options at any strike price on the given day.  This 
allows us to find the difference between the market price () and the B-S predicted 
price given by 
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In the above equation, is the market price of option j on day t of the underlying 
security and  is the B-S predicted price of that call option using the estimated true 
volatility.  
B. Systematic Difference between Market Price and B-S Predicted Price 
MacBeth and Merville find the difference between the market price of a call 
option and the B-S predicted price to be a function of the distance of the option’s 
strike price from the money and the option’s time to expiration.  MacBeth and 
Merville’s model estimating the difference between the market price and B-S 
predicted price of a call option is given by 
       
The regression is run separately, not only for each underlying security, but also for 
different properties of options.  Based on previous literature, finding differences in 
pricing errors between options with short or long times to expiration and options 
in- or out-of-the-money, each underlying security has four separate regressions to 
allow different estimates for all possible combinations of options near or far from 
expiration and in- or out-of-the-money.  
MacBeth and Merville’s model uses linear variables, but through 
empirical work a model including a squared term for distance from the money 
was found to be more appropriate (Blyler 2012).  In their 1979 paper, the data 
is not treated as panel data although options are followed over time, resulting 
in heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  More recent advances in panel data 
analysis have led to an increase in financial data being analyzed using panel 
techniques to correct for these problems inherent in the data (Petersen 2005, Gow 
et al. 2010).  Previous authors using panel data and similar regression techniques 
to estimate volatility have suggested the square of distance from the money 
and the liquidity of both the underlying asset and option contribute to pricing 
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difference from the B-S option pricing model (Ncube 1996, Feng 2011).  To allow 
analysis over all stocks, we introduce a new dependent variable,
     
 
Therefore, MacBeth and Merville’s original model is revised so that
         
            (9).
The variables y, m, and T are taken from equation 7, and the addition of 
m2 comes from our empirical work and other authors (Feng 2011, Blyler 2012). 
Furthermore, Feng’s work on the liquidity effect in the option market makes 
controlling for the volume of trading of each option on each day appropriate.  In 
his study, volume of trading also affected the curvature of the error caused by 
distance from the money.  In order to account for Feng’s finding,  is the number 
of trades an option had on a given day.  Its effect on the curvature is controlled for 
by multiplying , while its overall effect on the error is given in log scale because 
of decreasing returns.  The analysis of this paper focuses on the dummy variables 
and , representing price barriers above and below the underlying security’s current 
price respectively.  Price barriers above the current price, denoted , are expected 
to have a negative sign because they represent levels of resistance.  Alternatively, 
price barriers below the current price, denoted , are expected to have a positive 
sign because they represent levels of support.  
Previously mentioned price barriers have been found in the stock 
market by numerous authors; therefore, if the options market is efficient, then 
these price barriers should impact the market price of options because all 
available information in reflected in the price of the option.  The B-S model 
assumption of Brownian motion in a security’s price does not allow for price 
barriers to exist.  Hence, they cannot be priced into the B-S predicted price.   If 
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price barriers in the stock market are priced into call options, then those options 
with strikes near the barriers should have differences between the market and 
B-S predicted price not explained by other independent variables. How price 
barriers affect a stock, and therefore the corresponding options price, differ 
depending on the location of the barrier relative to the security’s current price. 
 A price barrier above a security’s current price acts as a level of resistance 
to a price increase.  As the price of a security approaches a level of resistance, 
its rate of change of price is expected to decrease.  Furthermore, the probability 
of the price rising above the price barrier is less than the probability of it rising 
above an arbitrary level that offers no resistance.  A smaller chance of breaking 
the level of resistance and an expected decrease in the rate of change should 
lower the price of options with strike prices near the barrier.  Out-of-the-money 
options have a lower probability of finishing in-the-money if the strike price is at 
or slightly above the barrier. Additionally, finishing far enough in-the-money for 
the buyer to recoup the B-S predicted option premium is less likely if the strike 
price is slightly below the barrier.  
Alternatively, a price barrier below a security’s current price can be seen 
as a level of support to a price drop.  As the price of a security decreases towards 
a level of support, the absolute rate of change is expected to slow.  The properties 
of a level of support act similarly to a level of resistance, but should result in a 
higher option price if the strike is near a level of support.  Such an option is less 
likely to fall out-of-the-money before expiration and should command a higher 
premium from the buyer.  
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IV. Hypothesized Price Barriers 
A. Bollinger Bands
 In this section, possible locations for price barriers are presented along 
with hypothesized reasons and potential implications.  The first location for 
possible price barriers comes from a commonly used financial technical indicator, 
Bollinger bands.  Bollinger bands were made famous by analyst John Bollinger 
who believed “asking the market what is happening is always a better approach 
than telling it what to do” (Bollinger 1992).  His standard for measuring volatility 
of a stock started with a simple n-period moving average of a stock’s price, which 
evolved into a weighted moving average in some cases, with k standard deviations 
of the stock’s last n prices added and subtracted from the moving average.  
For our analysis the period length is Bollinger’s suggested 20 days and 
the distance from the simple moving average is two standard deviations (Bollinger 
1992).  Bollinger bands being a measure of historic volatility, an investor could 
view the bands as price barriers the security’s price is unlikely to break if historic 
estimates of volatility hold.  She would then calculate the Bollinger bands at the 
end of a trading day and use those levels to adjust her valuation of options the 
upcoming day.  Using this strategy, investors would buy options near the bottom 
Bollinger band and write options near the top Bollinger band, driving prices up 
and down respectively.  Of course, an option’s strike price will rarely be exactly 
at a Bollinger band, meaning some distance must be deemed ‘close enough’ to the 
Bollinger band for investors to believe the effects of price barriers would play a 
role in evaluating the option.  
Options have strike prices at $10 intervals if the underlying security’s 
price is greater than $200, $5 intervals if the security’s price is between $25 
and $200, and $2.5 or $1 intervals if the price less than $25.  Notice the strike 
price interval is never less than 5% of the underlying security’s price besides 
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the extreme cases of very expensive stocks.  Working off of this, we deemed an 
option’s strike price ‘close enough’ to a Bollinger band if
This method effective creates a 5% interval around Bollinger band, but does not 
allow two different strike prices to be ‘close enough’ to the price barrier.  Because 
of the uncertainty of the differences between options with strike prices directly 
above and strike prices directly below the price barrier, two separate dummy 
variables are utilized; however, the expected sign on both is the same depending 
on the strike being near the upper or lower Bollinger band.  
 Bollinger bands suffer from a few draw backs that make them less 
likely price barriers than the other proposed barriers.  Investors can use 10 period 
Bollinger bands as well as vary the number of standard deviations added and 
subtracted, which would result in differing opinions about the exact location of 
price barriers.  Additionally, Bollinger bands change daily using this formula, 
meaning an investor using the above strategy would only believe the price barrier 
existed at that level for a day.  Options affected by a barrier for a day would not 
vary greatly in worth as it is likely they do not expire for many days to come and 
the barrier would likely shift by then.  A more realistic price barrier would stay 
constant throughout time, or at least for a meaningful length of time.
B. Round Numbers
 Most current literature on price barriers focuses on round numbers, 
meaning integers when a security’s price is low, multiples of ten when the price 
is slightly higher, or multiples of 100 when the price is higher still.  Many authors 
find the existence of price barriers at these numbers in a variety of securities and 
markets.  Barriers at round numbers are the easiest to defend as given because the 
psychological reasoning behind their existence is a staple of behavioral finance. 
!"#$%& − !"##$%&'(  !"#$ <    .025 ∗ !"#$%&'(")  !"#$%&'!!!  !"#$%. 
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Investors seem to weight round numbers more than their mathematical worth if 
markets are perfectly efficient.  
Here the issue that arises is options are often sold at round numbers as 
explained above.  To avoid this problem, barriers, or at least stronger barriers, are 
hypothesized to exist at round numbers seemingly more important to humans. 
For most securities, options are sold with strikes at multiples of ten or five 
because their underlying price is greater than $25.  As such, for all securities 
with a price of $20 or more, the important round number strike prices are chosen 
to be at multiples of $50.  For securities with a price less than $20, important 
round number strike prices were chosen at multiples of 5.  While these numbers 
are reasonable selections, there is an inherent weakness is simply choosing these 
barriers rather than investigating all round numbers; however, our methodology 
would not hold if all round numbers were taken into account.  
 There are multiple price barriers at any given time and the arguments 
for round numbers result in barriers switching between support and resistance 
depending on their position relative to the security’s current price.  This means a 
broken level of resistance becomes a level of support and should drive the price of 
the security higher as investors grow more confident in its performance.  Similarly, 
a broken level of support becomes resistance and should drive the price down even 
further.  This could counteract the differing value given to options with strikes near 
the barriers.  A less risk adverse investor may be willing to pay more for an option 
with a strike near a level of resistance, knowing if the option moves into the money, 
it is likely to move further into the money.  Additionally, an option with a strike near 
a level of support may not appear less risky knowing if the option moves out-of-
the-money one day it is less likely to move back into the money than other options. 
The final hypothesized price barrier locations avoid both problems of changing over 
time and switching between support and resistance.  
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C. Gann Levels
 Infamous investor W.D. Gann is known for his unorthodox beliefs 
about the stock market and the success he had with trading strategies based on 
seemingly unrelated occurrences.  From the effects of planetary retrograde motion 
to the mathematical properties of geometric shapes, Gann’s trading methods are 
unconventional; however, numerous books have been written by Gann and others 
about these special proportions in markets (Brown 1999).  While skepticism 
should accompany outlandish claims, the success and popularity of both the 
books and methods demonstrate many traders know about, if not use, Gann’s 
approach.   Knowing investors in the stock market may act differently at special 
price levels, their expected actions should be priced into the options market.  This 
makes no statement about the logic behind Gann’s method; rather, if enough 
investors believe his approach has merit it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 Although Gann makes numerous claims, the analysis here will focus on 
levels created by a method referred to as Gann’s wheel.2 Gann’s wheel involves 
levels of support coming from a pivot high and levels of resistance coming from 
a pivot low where a pivot is an important price level.  Following the methodology 
described in Brown 1999, we examined the charts of each stock in 2010 to find 
initial pivot highs and lows of our stocks.  These chosen pivots remained until the 
stock’s price fell below the pivot low or rose above the pivot high, at which point 
the broken pivot switched to  the new year to date high or low.  From here, Gann 
describes the angles 45, 90, 120, 180, 240, 270, 315, and 360 degrees of having 
particular importance.  In a Gann wheel, these angles are drawn from the pivot 
low and pivot high on a plane of price and time until they intersect what Gann 
calls the square of nine.  The time of the intersection is Gann’s prediction for when 
2 For a more detailed explanation of both how to pick pivot highs/lows and the methodology 
behind Gann’s wheel see Brown, Constance M. Technical analysis for the trading professional: 
Strategies and techniques for today’s turbulent global financial markets. McGraw-Hill, 1999.
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the stock’s price will reach that barrier; however for this analysis we will only 
focus on the price level at which the intersection occurs.  An example of these 
intersections can be seen in the figure below.  
(Brown pg 234, 1999)
These price barriers will remain constant until either the pivot high or pivot 
low changes, and the important intersections can be calculated by the following 
equations for a given degree.
 
   
   
Similar to the Bollinger Band price barriers, options are unlikely 
to be sold with strike prices exactly at Gann’s levels.  Again, 
the strike price is deemed ‘close enough’ to the price barrier if 
creating a buffer area for the strike price to fall.
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 The drawbacks of Gann’s price barriers come from their complexity 
and often misunderstood fundamentals.  Different trading programs calculate 
Gann levels with built in functions; however, these functions differ in their 
implementations of Gann’s wheel (Brown 1999).  If investors are not in agreement 
on the location of Gann’s price barriers, the effect on option prices would not 
be significant.  This could allow traders who correctly estimate Gann’s levels to 
make larger gains or it could push investors away from Gann’s method towards a 
more straightforward method.  
V. Data
 The data for this paper is called National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) data 
collected by Options Pricing and Reporting Authority (OPRA).  It contains 
information on the traded call options of 33 companies, most of which currently 
make up the DOW 30, as well as several important technology firms.  The firms 
and their ticker symbols are shown in the following table.
Company 
Name
Apple
American Express Co.
Bank of America Corp.
Boeing Co.
Citigroup Inc.
Caterpillar Inc.
Cummings Inc.
Chevron Corp.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.
Walt Disney Co.
General Electivc Co.
Google Inc.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Halliburton Co.
Hewlett-Packard Co.
Home Depot Inc.
Intel Corp.
Ticker 
Symbol
AAPL
AXP
BAC
BAC
C
CAT
CMI
CVX
DD
DIS
GE
GOOG
GS
HAL
HPQ
HD
INTC
Company 
Name
International Business Co.
Johnson & Johnson
JP Morgan Chase and Co.
The Coca-Cola Co.
3M Company
McDonald’s Corp.
Microsoft Corp.
Pfizer Inc.
Qualcomm Inc.
Transocean Ltd.
AT&T Inc.
United Technologies Corp.
Verizon Communications Inc.
Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
Exxon Mobil Corp.
Standard & Poors 500
Ticker 
Symbol
IBM
JNJ
JPM
KO
MMM
MCD
MSFT
PFE
QCOM
RIG
T
UTX
VZ
WMT
XOM
SPY
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The data is end of day data from all 252 trading days in 2011 with strike 
prices ranging from far in-the-money to far out-of-the-money.  The times to 
expirations at the initial sale of the options include one month, three months, 
six months, and a few times of a year or more.  All options are followed until 
expiration and every day includes the ending spreads, greeks, and trading volumes 
for the options.  
 Since the analysis relies on market prices containing all information, only 
options traded (trading volume greater than zero) on a specific day are included 
in the analysis.  Because the companies involved in the analysis are commonly 
traded companies, this does not eliminate many options besides those with strike 
prices too far away from the underlying security’s price to be useful to traders, 
or those with extremely long times to expiration.  In order to eliminate data we 
viewed as likely mistakes, options that were sold for less than the intrinsic value 
of the option were not included. Additionally, options with less than two days 
to expiration are not included in the analysis because end of the day data is not 
reflective of the changes occurring with only a couple days left in the life of the 
option.  
 Using regressions to estimate the true volatility of a stock’s return creates 
a weighted average of implied volatility from all of the traded options on that 
day.  In order to assure enough inputs into the weighted average, the true implied 
volatility is only calculated if options with 5 different strikes or expirations were 
traded that day.   This estimate is then used to calculate the inputs required in the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model.  In order to estimate the annualized risk free 
rate, the annualized return rate on a three month U.S. Treasury Bill was obtained 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.  The time to expiration is obviously not always 
three months; however, this should not be a problem because annualized Treasury 
Bill returns only vary slightly with changes in time to maturity from a day to a 
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year, and the B-S predicted call price lacks sensitivity to the riskless return rate. 
In fact, MacBeth and Merville note, “…[their] results would be virtually identical 
had [they] used a single riskless return for a Treasury Bill… .”  
The data used differs from MacBeth’s and Merville’s data in two distinct 
ways.  First, the data includes information on more than five times the number of 
stocks.  Second, many days have over fifty observations used in the regression 
to calculate the estimated at-the-money volatility.   These advantages allow for 
stronger conclusions because it reduces the likelihood that small sample sizes will 
cause the results.  
VI. Results
Looking at the difference between the market price and B-S predicted price as 
a percent of the market price allows for comparison of options regardless of the 
underlying stock.  However, our data set does not allow for comparison regardless 
of distance from the money.  Using our formula the percent error cannot go above 
100%, but it has no lower bound.  When options are in-the-money, y% has a 
smaller range and a reasonable standard deviation, with summary statistics 
On the other hand, with options out of the money, y% has a much larger range, 
as seen below:
The extreme difference leads to drastically different coefficient estimates in 
our regression, which are divided up between in- or out-of-the-money and less 
or greater than 90 days to expiration.  This division is based on the differences 
in pricing observed by Black, MacBeth and Merville, and others.  As such, the 
 
Variable	   Observations	   Mean	  
Std.	  
Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
y%	   296554	   0.534	   12.091	   -­‐2622	   98	  
 
 
 
Variable	   Observations	   Mean	  
Std.	  
Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
y%	   398889	   -­‐61.05	   154	   -­‐16620	   100	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   28.032**	   27.899**	   27.556**	  
	  
(1.123)	   (1.138)	   (1.148)	  
m’2	   -­‐34.192**	   -­‐34.103**	   -­‐33.014**	  
	  
(2.293)	   (2.304)	   (2.286)	  
month	   -­‐0.152**	   -­‐0.152**	   -­‐0.131**	  
	  
(0.011)	   (0.011)	   (0.011)	  
volume	   -­‐0.316**	   -­‐0.319**	   -­‐0.334**	  
	  
(0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.026)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.068**	   0.068**	   0.080*	  
	  
(0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.032)	  
Lower	  BB	  Above	   -­‐0.202	  
	   	  
	  
(0.124)	  
	   	  Lower	  BB	  Under	   0.373**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.104)	  
	   	  Gann	  Support	  Above	  
	   	  
0.051	  
	   	   	  
(0.085)	  
Gann	  Support	  Below	  
	   	  
0.124	  
	   	   	  
(0.082)	  
Round	  Number	  Under	  
	  
0.114	  
	  
	   	  
(0.180)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐3.060**	   -­‐3.053**	   -­‐3.468**	  
	  
(0.202)	   (0.200)	   (0.214)	  
Observations	   148696	   148696	   163745	  
R-­‐squared	   0.19	   0.19	   0.19	  
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  
+	  significant	  at	  10%;	  *	  significant	  at	  5%;	  **	  significant	  at	  1%	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coefficients of the regressions are less important than the significance and sign of 
the coefficients.  In all regressions, observations are demeaned by the underlying 
stock and the standard errors are clustered by option, allowing for correlation 
between the errors of the same option sold on different days.  Clustering by 
option, prevents the autocorrelation that plagued previous papers (see MacBeth 
and Merville 1979, Blyler 2012) and makes the significance tests useable.  
Running the regression on options in the money with more than 90 days 
to expiration yields the following results where positive coefficients mean higher 
relative market value.
The first proposed price barriers, Bollinger bands, have contradicting 
signs for their coefficients; however, only the coefficient on the variable for 
options with strikes slightly below the lower Bollinger band is statistically 
significant.  This is promising as it has the sign predicted by our hypothesis that 
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investors likely view the lower Bollinger band as a level of support and therefore 
options with strikes slightly below the band are more likely to finish in the money 
and should have a higher market value than other equivalent options.  The results 
for options with strikes at our selected round numbers also suggest investors may 
view round numbers as a level of support, but the coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  An option with a strike near a Gann level of support, while yielding 
coefficients with the sign predicted by our hypothesis, also does not result in a 
statistically significant increase in the option’s price.  While the results of the first 
regression are promising, similar results are needed in order to provide strong 
evidence for our hypothesis.
 The same regressions run on options with less than 90 days to expiration 
yields certain contradictory results, preventing stronger inferences from being 
made about levels of support. 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   32.181**	   32.228**	   30.334**	  
	  
(1.633)	   (1.621)	   (2.248)	  
m’2	   -­‐54.963**	   -­‐55.247**	   -­‐52.348**	  
	  
(3.288)	   (3.297)	   (3.315)	  
month	   -­‐0.693**	   -­‐0.698**	   -­‐0.823**	  
	  
(0.059)	   (0.059)	   (0.082)	  
volume	   -­‐0.551**	   -­‐0.560**	   -­‐0.742**	  
	  
(0.035)	   (0.035)	   (0.053)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.077**	   0.080**	   0.177**	  
	  
(0.022)	   (0.023)	   (0.050)	  
Lower	  BB	  Above	   -­‐0.498**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.170)	  
	   	  Lower	  BB	  Below	   0.496**	  
	   	  
	  
(0.137)	  
	   	  Gann	  Support	  Above	  
	   	  
-­‐0.455**	  
	   	   	  
(0.163)	  
Gann	  Support	  Below	  
	   	  
-­‐0.044	  
	   	   	  
(0.153)	  
Round	  Number	  Under	  
	  
0.279	  
	  
	   	  
(0.245)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐2.689**	   -­‐2.749**	   -­‐3.312**	  
	  
(0.246)	   (0.237)	   (0.407)	  
Observations	   111662	   111662	   132823	  
R-­‐squared	   0.15	   0.15	   0.04	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 Switching from options that are far from expiration to options that are 
near to expiration not only affected the signs of some of our variables of interest but 
also their significance levels.  Options with strikes just below the lower Bollinger 
Band once again have an increased value in the market’s view and this increase is 
statistically significant.  Once again, options with strikes slightly above the lower 
Bollinger Band are less valuable relative to the B-S predicted price, but this time 
the difference is statistically significant.  Our hypothesis has no explanation for 
this phenomenon, but the positive and statistically significant coefficient when the 
strike is slightly below the lower Bollinger band provides evidence that investors 
do use the previous day’s Bollinger band to predict the stock’s future movement 
and investors believe a stock’s price is less likely to fall below the lower Bollinger 
band than an arbitrarily selected price.  A possible reason for this phenomenon is 
the liquidity of the options market allows investors to trade frequently; therefore, 
they only try to predict movements for a short time before selling the option.   
Price barriers at round numbers appear to have the expected affect in 
the options market, although the coefficients were not statistically significant in 
either regression.  Price barriers being a relatively new discovery in the stock 
market, investors may be slow to change their evaluation methods.  A smaller 
number of investors using round numbers as levels of support may be pushing the 
price of these options higher, but not a significant amount because other investors 
continue to pull the price downwards.  
The result from Gann’s levels of support in this second regression is 
most surprising.  The statistically significant negative sign suggests investors 
pay attention to Gann’s levels; however, investors value options with strikes near 
Gann’s levels of support less than other options.  The inconsistency between 
options near to expiration and options far from expiration may be from the time 
aspect of Gann’s wheel that is not incorporated into this analysis.  If Gann’s wheel 
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predicts a level of support being reached long after an option expires, investors are 
unlikely to put weight into Gann’s analysis.  Our hypothesis does not explain the 
statistically significant negative coefficient for options with strikes near Gann’s 
level of support with less than 90 days to expiration.  It does not appear that 
Gann’s levels of support, at least using the levels our methodology located, are of 
importance to investors.  
Next, the regressions are run on options out-of-the-money; thus we 
move from level of support to resistance.  These coefficients are not comparable 
to the previous two tables; however, the signs and significance test are still viable. 
We again begin with options with more than 90 days to expiration and find the 
following with regards to levels of resistance.
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   374.262**	   379.530**	   358.130**	  
	  
(14.297)	   (13.867)	   (12.802)	  
m’2	   90.057**	   92.373**	   85.137**	  
	  
(11.765)	   (11.922)	   (11.329)	  
month	   3.035**	   3.062**	   3.091**	  
	  
(0.191)	   (0.195)	   (0.176)	  
volume	   1.110**	   1.247**	   1.090**	  
	  
(0.326)	   (0.341)	   (0.314)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   0.313	   0.314	   0.343	  
	  
(0.300)	   (0.301)	   (0.304)	  
Upper	  BB	  Above	   7.888**	  
	   	  
	  
(1.319)	  
	   	  Upper	  BB	  Below	   6.609**	  
	   	  
	  
(1.550)	  
	   	  Gann	  Resistance	  Above	  
	   	  
11.594**	  
	   	   	  
(1.582)	  
Gann	  Resistance	  Below	  
	   	  
16.573**	  
	   	   	  
(1.722)	  
Round	  Number	  Above	  
	  
-­‐4.877	  
	  
	   	  
(3.395)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐14.314**	   -­‐11.259**	   -­‐23.244**	  
	  
(2.321)	   (2.144)	   (2.060)	  
Observations	   220929	   220929	   237111	  
R-­‐squared	   0.27	   0.27	   0.28	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Analyzing out-of-the-money options with strikes near Bollinger Bands, 
the results are opposite of what our hypothesis suggests. Options with strikes 
around the upper Bollinger band appear to have a higher relative value to 
investors.  A possible explanation is investors believe the upper Bollinger Band 
acts as a spring board and once broken investors will buy up the stock, increasing 
the price significantly past the strike price.  As seen in options out-of-the-money, 
investors seem to impute a higher probability to a stock’s price staying within the 
Bollinger bands, so the increase in price expected if the upper Bollinger band is 
broken must be large enough to offset this decreased probability of its occurrence. 
Alternatively, investors may simply put less weight in the upper Bollinger band, 
believing the market will be bullish and the upper Bollinger band will not be as 
important.  
Options with strikes at round numbers continue demonstrate the expected 
effects of a price barrier on the option market; however, the coefficient is still not 
statistically significant.  Gann’s levels of resistance on the other hand, display 
similar traits to the upper Bollinger band.  Options with strikes near to a Gann 
level of resistance, whether the strike price is slightly above or below the barrier, 
have a higher relative value to investors.  Since Gann levels do not switch between 
support and resistance relative to the underlying stock’s price, our hypothesis does 
not explain this occurrence.  
Similarly, the regressions on options close to expiration find the 
following results, supporting the results for levels of resistance from options far 
from expiration.
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In options near to expiration, the only proposed price barrier with 
a significant effect is the Bollinger band.  Again, options with strikes near the 
upper Bollinger band are of relative higher value to investors, contradicting our 
hypothesis.  The Gann barriers appear to be insignificant when the option is 
close to expiration for both levels of support and resistance.  This is most likely 
explained by our exclusion of the time component of Gann’s wheel.  
Options with strikes near our selected important round numbers again 
have the expected devaluation associated with a level of resistance.  Throughout 
our analysis, round numbers have not had a statistically significant coefficient, 
but have continually had the predicted change relative to the B-S predicted price.
 Overall, the results for round numbers and the lower Bollinger band 
are promising, but the significant coefficients of the wrong sign do not provide 
strong support for our hypothesis.  Because Bollinger bands and Gann levels have 
 
	  
y%	   y%	   y%	  
m’	   34.360*	   48.320**	   50.946**	  
	  
(17.394)	   (17.995)	   (15.917)	  
m’2	   72.511**	   80.594**	   69.491**	  
	  
(17.056)	   (18.185)	   (13.968)	  
month	   -­‐18.036**	   -­‐18.136**	   -­‐24.714**	  
	  
(1.234)	   (1.238)	   (1.166)	  
volume	   5.258**	   5.945**	   0.464	  
	  
(0.494)	   (0.514)	   (0.544)	  
volume	  *	  m’2	   -­‐4.464	   -­‐4.846+	   -­‐1.421	  
	  
(2.755)	   (2.878)	   (2.145)	  
Upper	  BB	  Above	   8.851**	  
	   	  
	  
(2.269)	  
	   	  Upper	  BB	  Below	   27.004**	  
	   	  
	  
(2.168)	  
	   	  Gann	  Resistance	  Above	  
	   	  
-­‐0.052	  
	   	   	  
(2.525)	  
Gann	  Resistance	  Below	  
	   	  
4.728+	  
	   	   	  
(2.565)	  
Round	  Number	  Above	  
	  
-­‐7.558	  
	  
	   	  
(4.723)	  
	  
Constant	   -­‐24.072**	   -­‐15.152**	   -­‐26.201**	  
	  
(2.647)	   (2.502)	   (3.086)	  
Observations	   139226	   139226	   161778	  
R-­‐squared	   0.15	   0.14	   0.08	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not been explored as price barriers in the literature, it is not surprising options 
with strikes near those levels do not act as expected; although, the statistically 
significant coefficients suggests more research is needed at these levels.  The 
obvious skew caused by taking the difference as a percentage of market price 
hinders comparison and most literature focuses on absolute difference between the 
market price and the B-S price.  Further exploration into the effect of examining 
the error as a percentage of market prices is needed before absolute conclusions 
can be drawn.  
VII. Conclusions
A. Price Barrier Hypothesis
We propose three price barriers, Bollinger bands, round numbers, and 
Gann levels, in the stock market and attempt to find evidence of their internalization 
in the options market.  Options with strikes near levels of support are expected 
to have higher market prices, whereas the opposite should be true if the strikes 
are near a level of resistance because the B-S price does not take the lowered 
probability of breaking a price barrier into account.  To find relatively lower and 
higher prices, the market price is compared to the Black-Scholes Option Pricing 
Model predicted price, which does not allow for price barriers to exist in the stock 
market.  
We find evidence of systematic deviation from the B-S price at Bollinger 
bands in options both in- and out-of-the-money.  Gann levels of resistance had 
the opposite effect of what was expected, and the levels of support did not appear 
to have an effect on the price of options.  This suggests investors are more 
comfortable with conventional measures when attempting to estimate volatility; 
however, if Gann levels act as price barriers in the stock market, investors could 
make substantial profits by buying options at levels of support and selling those at 
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levels of resistance.  Testing this proposed trading method is left for future work. 
The results for options with strikes near round numbers were inconclusive 
although there was evidence of them beginning to be treated as levels of support 
and resistance.  Although no coefficient was statistically significant, all had the 
sign predicted by our hypothesis.  Not only does this support the behavioral 
finance findings of price barriers in the stock market, but also shows efficiency 
in the options market as option traders recognize patterns in the stock market not 
allowed by the efficient market hypothesis.
Closer to hypothesized results were found when analyzing options in-the-
money, possibly because of the use of options as a hedge.  Increased attention to 
in-the-money options could push the price closer to the fair present value, while 
out-of-the-money options have a less efficient price.  This paper does not attempt 
to prove the existence of price barriers in the stock market; rather it examines how 
the options market acts around special price values.  Significant results provide 
evidence that investors do care about certain price levels more than others, although 
further exploration is needed to completely understand how the option market 
internalizes investor preferences of these numbers.  However, when looking for 
systematic errors in the B-S model, special price levels should be included with 
the commonly accepted distance from the money, time to expiration, and liquidity 
control variables.  The discovery of price barriers affecting the options market 
allows future research on price barriers to occur regardless of a stock’s current price.
B. Updated Expected Volatility Hypothesis
 Differences between the market price and B-S predicted price of options 
with strikes near Bollinger bands and Gann levels had differences not explained by 
previously found control variables, but these differences were not the differences 
predicted by our hypothesis.  The coefficients on the dummy variables being 
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statistically significant indicate investors do pay attention to these levels, but not 
in our hypothesized manner.  When the Bollinger bands were below the current 
price, hypothesized to act as levels of support, options just above (inside) the 
band were valued less, while options just below (outside) the band were valued 
more.  For both Bollinger bands and Gann levels, when the strike was near 
those proposed barriers and above the strike price the results were opposite the 
hypothesized result.  If those barriers acted as levels of resistance, the coefficient 
would be negative, but in both cases it was positive and statistically significant.  
 To explain these divergences from our original hypothesis, we propose an 
alternative explanation.  Bollinger bands and Gann levels may not have any effect 
on a stock’s price, but investors may pay attention to them for other reasons.  The 
B-S predicted price, which is commonly used by investors as a baseline, depends 
heavily on expected volatility of a stock.  When evaluating a stock, investors often 
look at not only the price, but also technicals such as Bollinger bands.  Therefore, 
an investor may use Bollinger bands and Gann levels as indicators their original 
estimation of volatility needs to be updated.3  Updating expected volatility around 
these levels would result in higher values for the option relative to the B-S price 
that holds a constant expected volatility estimate.  This hypothesis explains the 
positive coefficient around barriers proposed to be levels of resistance and why 
levels of support followed our initial hypothesis more closely than resistance. 
Further research is needed to test the validity of this hypothesis, but it appears as if 
academic researchers need to obtain more information from real investors before 
price barriers can be fully explored.  
3 Imagine seeing a stock price with Bollinger bands and using its historical volatility to estimate 
volatility.  Since Bollinger bands are 2 SD away from the moving average, if the price breaks 
out of the bands, then the historical estimate is likely incorrect.  At that time it may be best to 
update expected volatility to a larger value.  Therefore, if Bollinger bands or Gann levels are 
reached, expected volatility expands and options are worth more.  
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